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APPLYING THE EQUAL PAY ACT TO STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: THE EFFECT
OF NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES v. USERY
1. INTRODUCTION
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 19381 (FLSA) establishes a
minimum wage that employers are required to pay their emp-
loyees "who... [are] engaged in commerce or in the production
of goods for commerce, or [are] employed in an enterprise en-
gaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce
.... "2 The FLSA also provides that any employee who works
more than a specified maximum number of hours per week
must be compensated at a rate at least one and one-half times his
regular rate for hours worked in excess of the maximum.3
As originally enacted, the FLSA did not define "employer"
to include a "State or political subdivision of a State";4 state and
local governments thus were exempted from the wage and hour
requirements of the Act. In 1966, however, Congress removed
this exemption with regard to employees of state and local
government hospitals, schools, institutions for the sick, aged,
or mentally ill, and public transportation if the rates and ser-
vices of such transportation are regulated by a state or local
government agency.5 The Supreme Court subsequently upheld
the application of the FLSA to state and local government hospi-
tals and schools in Maryland v. Wirtz.6 In 1974, Congress further
reduced exemption from coverage under the FLSA 7 to public
officeholders and their staffs and advisors.8 Thus, for most of
their employees, public employers were subject to wage and
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) (originally enacted as Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060).
2 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1970).
3 1d. § 207(a)(1).
4 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, ch. 676, § 3(d), 52 Stat.
1060 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), 203(x) (Supp. IV 1974)).
5 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(b), 80 Stat.
830 (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), 203(x) (Supp. IV 1974)).
6 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled, National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465
(1976).
' Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(1), 88
Stat. 58 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d), 203(x) (Supp. IV 1974)).
8 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(C) (Supp. IV 1974). The FLSA also contains a general ex-
emption for executive, administrative, and professional personnel. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)
(1970 & Supp. IV 1974).
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hour requirements under the amended FLSA that were the
same as those to which private employers had been subject pre-
viously.
Following the passage of the 1974 amendments, the Na-
tional League of Cities, the National Governors' Conference, and
several state and local governments9 sought to enjoin the en-
forcement of the FLSA against police and fire departments.10
A three-judge district court, relying on Wirtz, dismissed the
complaint.1 The Supreme Court, in National League of Cities
v. Usery,'12 reversed, holding that "insofar as the challenged
amendments operate to directly displace the States' freedom to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmen-
tal functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress
by [the commerce clause]."' 3
Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.
14
Relying on the tenth amendment's reservation to the states of
powers not delegated to the federal government and "the essen-
tial role of the States in [the] federal system, ' 15 he reasoned that
the Constitution contains affirmative limitations upon Congress'
power to override state sovereignty. Therefore, legislation ad-
mittedly within the scope of the commerce clause nonetheless
exceeds Congress' power if it infringes on the sovereign powers
reserved to the states. Discussing state sovereignty, he stated:
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the
States' power to determine the wages which shall be
paid to those whom they employ in order to carry out
their governmental functions, what hours those persons
will work, and what compensation will be provided
where these employees may be called upon to work
overtime.1
6
9 State governments of Arizona, California, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington; local governments of
Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., Cape Girardeau, Mo., Lompoc, Cal., and Salt
Lake City, Utah. National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465, 2467 n.7 (1976).
10 National League of Cities v. Brennan, 419 U.S. 1321 (1974) (preliminary injunc-
tion).
11 National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826 (D.D.C. 1974) (three-
judge court), rev'd sub nom. National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
12 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
13 Id. at 2474.
14 Burger, C.J. and Powell, Stewart, and Blackmun, JJ. joined in the opinion. Jus-
tice Blackmun also filed a concurring opinion. See note 20 infra.
'* 96 S. Ct. at 2470. The tenth amendment reads: "The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
16 96 S. Ct. at 2471.
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Justice Rehnquist concluded that although congressional regula-
tion of employees' wages and hours is within the scope of the
commerce power, 17 when applied to state employees engaged in
"traditional governmental functions"' 8 it infringes upon state
sovereignty and is unconstitutional. Maryland v. Wirtz, which held
that the wage and hour provisions of the FLSA could constitu-
tionally be applied to state and local government schools and
hospitals,1 9 was overruled.
20
The Court in National League of Cities considered the applica-
tion to state and local government employees of only the wage
and hour provisions of the FLSA. The practical effect of the
decision, however, may not be so narrow; in 1963 the FLSA was
amended by the Equal Pay Act,2 ' which bars an employer from
discriminating
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages
to employees ... at a rate less than the rate at which he
pays wages to employees of the opposite sex .. . for
equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are per-
formed under similar working conditions ....2
As part of the FLSA, the application of the Equal Pay Act un-
derwent the same evolution as the FLSA's wage and hour provi-
sions: when enacted in 1963 the Equal Pay Act was inapplicable
to state and local governments;2 3 in 1966 the existing exemption
1 Id. at 2468-69. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
18 96 S. Ct. at 2474.
'9 See text accompanying note 6 supra.
20 96 S. Ct. at 2468.
Justice Blackmun concurred in a brief opinion, id. at 2476, (Blackmun, J., con-
curring), interpreting the Court's opinion as adopting a balancing approach that would
not bar the application of federal power "in areas where the federal interest is demon-
strably greater" than that of the states. Id. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan, joined
by Justices Marshall and White, id. at 2476-88, (Brennan, J., dissenting) argued that
there is no restraint on Congress' commerce power based on state sovereignty any-
where in the Constitution and that "decisions over the last century and a half have
explicitly rejected the existence of any such restraint .... Id. at 2477 (footnote omit-
ted). He accused the majority of "discard[ing] roughshod" the reasoning of prior deci-
sions, id. at 2483, overruling Wirtz through an "exercise of raw judicial power," id. at
2487, and striking "a catastrophic judicial body blow at Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause." Id. Justice Stevens also dissented, finding the "principle on which
the holding rests ... difficult to perceive." Id. at 2488 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21 Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 206(d) (1970)). For a discussion of the operation of the Equal Pay Act and its interpre-
tation by various courts, see Murphy, Female Wage Discrimination: A Study of the Equal Pay
Act 1963-1970, 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 615 (1970); 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 409 (1973).
22 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970).
23 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
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for public employees was removed as to employees of state and
local hospitals, institutions, schools, and public transportation;
24
in 1974 the exemption was further reduced to cover only public
officeholders and their staffs and advisors.2 5
This Comment seeks to determine whether the Equal Pay
Act is constitutional under National League of Cities.26 The Com-
ment first examines the constitutionality of the Act as an exercise
of Congress' commerce power, 27 and concludes that it suffers
from the same infirmities that led the Court to invalidate the
FLSA's wage and hour provisions when applied to employees
engaged in "traditional governmental functions." Thus, after Na-
tional League of Cities, the Equal Pay Act, when applied to public
employment relationships in such functions, is an unconstitu-
tional exercise of congressional commerce power. Because Na-
tional League of Cities, however, preserves the constitutionality of
Congress' exercise of the commerce power in state and local
government employment relationships in nontraditional gov-
ernmental functions, 28 the Equal Pay Act is constitutional when
applied to public employees engaged in such functions. The
Comment, therefore, seeks to discover which governmental
functions the Court deems "traditional," but concludes that aside
from examples of "traditional governmental functions" provided
by the Court29 and an emphasis on certain factors about the
nature of a "traditional governmental function,' '3 0 no clear guide
emerges from National League of Cities by which one can deter-
mine whether a governmental function is nontraditional and
therefore a permissible area for the exercise of Congress' com-
merce power. Finally, the Comment examines the constitutional-
ity of the Equal Pay Act as an exercise of Congress' power under
the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment and con-
cludes that application of the Act to public employees in both
24 See text accompanying notes 5-6 supra.
25 See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
26 Several courts have ruled that the holding in National League of Cities extends
only to the FLSA's wage and hour provisions and not to the Equal Pay Act. E.g., Usery
v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 421 F. Supp. 111, 113-14 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Usery
v. Kent State Univ., No. C 75-550, slip op. at 4 (D. Ohio Oct. 7, 1976); Christensen v.
Iowa, 13 FEP Cases 161, 162 (D. Iowa 1976). Contra, Howard v. Ward City, 418 F. Supp.
494, 500-01 (D.N.D. 1976).
27 See Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 2(b), 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 202(b) (1970)) (the policy of the Act is to be pursued "through the exercise by
Congress of its power to regulate commerce among the several States").
28 See notes 53-57 infra & accompanying text.
29 See note 69 infra & accompanying text.
"See notes 58-77 infra & accompanying text.
EQUAL PAY ACT
traditional and nontraditional governmental functions is a con-
stitutional exercise of that congressional power.
II. THE EQUAL PAY ACT AS AN EXERCISE
OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMERCE POWER
Although the Court did not consider the equal pay provi-
sions of the FLSA in National League of Cities,31 its analysis is
important for a determination of the constitutionality of those
provisions; Congress based the validity of both the equal pay and
the wage and hour provisions on the same grounds: the com-
merce powerf 2 If the equal pay provisions of the FLSA do not
"operate to directly displace the State's freedom to structure integral oper-
ations in areas of traditional governmental functions"33-a dis-
placement that led the Court to invalidate the wage and hour
provisions in such areas-then the Equal Pay Act is a valid exer-
cise of Congress' commerce power and may be applied in tradi-
tional as well as nontraditional governmental functions. 34 It is
necessary, then, to determine what kind of interference in the
conduct of "traditional government functions" is impermissible
after National League of Cities and then to determine whether the
Act constitutes such an impermissible interference.
The Court indicated that the effects of the imposition of
federal wage and hour standards on traditional state operations
together with the existence of legitimate state purposes in failing
to meet those standards in public employment resulted in an
impermissible interference with state sovereignty.35 The effects
of the wage and hour provisions the Court focused on were the
increased cost of providing services at existing levels due to in-
creased state payrolls 36 and the resulting reduction in both the
quality and quantity of services provided.3 7 The states' legitimate
purposes in employing people without complying with the
31 96 S. Ct. at 2468, 2471-74.
32 See note 27 supra & accompanying text.
33 96 S. Ct. at 2474 (emphasis supplied).
34 The FLSA contains a separability of provisions clause: "If any provision of this
Chapter or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is held
invalid, the remainder of this chapter and the application of such provision to other
persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby." 29 U.S.C. § 219 (1970). When a
court rules on a section of a statute containing such a clause, it is to consider only the
section before it. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1
(1961); Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938).
35 96 S. Ct. at 2471-74.
36 Id. at 2471-72.
37 Id.; see text accompanying notes 62-64 infra.
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FLSA's wage and hour requirements included employment of
untrained or unskilled workers,3 8 part-time workers,3 9 or teen-
agers in the summer;40 by employing such people at less than the
minimum wage, a state could provide them with valuable job
experiences while reducing welfare and unemployment rolls. To
the extent a state is precluded or hindered in the pursuit of
these purposes, "the [wage and hour provisions of the FLSA]
displace state policies regarding the manner in which they will
structure delivery of those governmental services which their
citizens require. '41 Because of the effects of the imposition of
federal wage and hour standards on state operations and the
existence of legitimate state purposes in failing to meet those
standards, interference with "the states' power to determine the
wages which shall be paid to those whom they employ in order to
carry out their governmental functions, what hours those per-
sons will work, and what compensation will be provided where
these employees may be called upon to work overtime"42 is im-
permissible in the area of "traditional governmental functions.
43
The equal pay provisions, in contrast to the FLSA's wage
and hour provisions, neither set wage and hour standards nor
interfere with the states' ability to "structure employer-employee
relationships. '44 They require only that the states' pay scales be
applied equally to men and women who perform equal work.
Also unlike the wage and hour provisions, the Equal Pay Act sets
no substantive terms of employment. The states remain free to
set wages, hours, days of work, and all other terms and condi-
tions of employment as they see fit, as long as they do not do so
in a discriminatory fashion. Moreover, in contrast with setting
wages, hours, and rates of overtime compensation, sex discrimi-
nation in employment is neither an exercise of discretion essen-
tial to state sovereignty nor an undoubted attribute of such
sovereignty. 45 Engaging in sex discrimination in wages serves no
legitimate state purpose, and the Court has in recent years sub-
jected such discrimination to increasingly strict scrutiny.
46
38 96 S. Ct. at 2472.
39 
Id.
40
Id.
41 Id.
4 2
1 d. at 2471.
13 Id. at 2474.
44Id.
41 Usery v. Bettendorf Community School Dist., Civ. No. 76-6-D, slip op. at 2 (D.
Iowa Sept. 1, 1976); Christensen v. Iowa, 13 FEP Cases 161, 163 (D. Iowa 1976).
46See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (statutory classification of
spouses of male members of uniformed services as "dependent" for purposes of in-
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The equal pay provisions, then, insofar as they require only
equal pay for equal work, do not infringe upon state sovereignty
in a manner that the Court found impermissible in National
League of Cities. A federal requirement of equal pay for equal
work displaces no legitimate state options, nor does it interfere
with the states' discretion in structuring employment relation-
ships.
The Equal Pay Act provides, however, that "an employer
who is paying a wage differential in violation of this subsection
shall not, in order to comply with the provisions of this subsec-
tion, reduce the wage of any employee. 14 7 A state or local gov-
ernment, then, must raise the wages of any employee underpaid
in violation of the Act. This requirement increases the cost of
dispensing state services and places the states in the same di-
lemma that they were placed in by the FLSA's wage and hour
requirements;4 8 they must either reduce important services or
raise additional revenue to meet the higher payroll the Equal
Pay Act requires them to pay. Thus, the Equal Pay Act, as an
exercise of the power to regulate commerce, suffers from the
same constitutional infirmity that the FLSA's wage and hour
provisions49 suffered from and may not be applied to employees
creased benefits, where spouses of female members are so classified only if they are in
fact dependent for over one-half of their support, violative of equal protection clause);
cf. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (age of majority of 18 for women and 21 for
men for purposes of required child support violative of equal protection clause); Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (survivor's benefits paid to widow and minor
children of deceased husband but only to minor children of deceased wife, and not to
widower, violative of equal protection clause); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (statu-
tory preference of men over women for appointment as administrator of a decedent's
estate violative of equal protection clause). But cf. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975) (legislation establishing different tenure rules for male and female military offi-
cers found to have a rational basis); Geduldigv. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (exclusion
of normal pregnancy from compensable employee disability benefits upheld); Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (tax benefits for widows but not widowers upheld as having
a rational basis).
47 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970).
48 See text accompanying notes 36 & 37 supra.
41 It might be argued that the Equal Pay Act is a valid exercise of congressional
commerce power under Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), which the Court in
National League of Cities said was unaffected by the National League of Cities holding. 96
S. Ct. at 2474. In Fry, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a temporary wage freeze
on state and local government employees pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970. The wage freeze that Fry held valid, however, "displaced no state choices as to
how governmental operations should be structured ... [but] merely required that the
wage scales and employment relationships which the States themselves had chosen be
maintained . I..." d. at 2474-75. Similarly, the state and local governments set their
own wage rates under the Equal Pay Act. Unlike the situation in Fry, however, where
the states' wage scales were frozen and the financial burden on the states therefore not
affected, the Equal Pay Act requires the public employers to raise some employees'
1977]
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in "traditional governmental functions. '' "
The Court's opinion in National League of Cities, however,
did not invalidate the exercise of Congress' commerce power in
areas of nontraditional governmental functions,51 whether or
not that exercise "displace[s] the States' freedom to structure
integral operations"52 in those areas. This Comment now at-
tempts to discern which governmental activities the Court deems
"traditional"; outside of such activities, the equal pay provisions
(as well as the wage and hour provisions) are a valid exercise of
the commerce power.
III. THE "TRADITIONAL GOVERNMENTAL
FUNCTION" TEST
National League of Cities holds that Congress' power under
the commerce clause is insufficient to permit Congress to impose
the FLSA's wage and hour requirements on the states for their
employees engaged in areas of "traditional governmental func-
tions"; the commerce power may not be exercised in a manner
that so substantially interferes with "traditional aspects of state
sovereignty. ' 53 The Court emphasized that the decision does not
prohibit Congress from exercising its commerce power over pub-
lic employment relationships in areas of state and local govern-
mental activities not considered to be "traditional governmental
wages and thus increases the financial burden on them. The Court in National League of
Cities found that an increase of the financial burden on the state and local governments
interfered with states' sovereignty. See text accompanying notes 36 & 37 supra. Moreover,
the wage freeze was temporary and in effect for a limited, specific period of time,
whereas the Equal Pay Act is permanent in effect. 96 S. Ct. at 2474-75.
" A number of courts, however, have ruled, in light of National League of Cities,
that the Equal Pay Act is a valid exercise of Congress' commerce power. Usery v. Dallas
Independent School Dist., 421 F. Supp. 111, 116 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Usery v. Kent
State Univ., No. C 75-550, slip op. at 4, 5 (D. Ohio Oct. 7, 1976); Usery v. Bettendorf
Community School Dist., Civ. No. 76-6-D, slip op. at 2, 3 (D. Iowa Sept. 1, 1976);
Christensen v. Iowa, 13 FEP Cases 161 (D. Iowa 1976). These cases involved suits
against local and state government employers for violations of the Equal Pay Act.
Following National League of Cities, the defendant governments filed motions either
to dismiss or for summary judgment on the grounds that National League of Cities pre-
cludes application of the Equal Pay Act to state and local governments. In rejecting
such motions, these courts either engaged in minimal analysis that neglected to consider
the Equal Pay Act's requirement that no employees' wages be lowered to conform to the
Act's dictate, e.g., Christensen v. Iowa, 13 FEP Cases 161 (D. Iowa 1976), or erroneously
assumed that a state may reduce an employee's wages in order to comply with the EPA,
"thus impos[ing] no burden whatsoever on the States." Usery v. Dallas Independent
School Dist., 421 F. Supp. 111, 116 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
"' See text accompanying notes 53-57 infra.
32 96 S. Ct. at 2474; see text accompanying note 33 supra.
53 96 S. Ct. at 2473.
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functions" by expressly declining to overrule 54 United States v.
California55 and other cases56 holding that Congress may subject
state owned and operated railroads to its commerce power.
Thus, the Equal Pay Act, like the wage and hour provisions of
the FLSA, remains valid when applied to state employees not
engaged in "traditional governmental functions."
The National League of Cities opinion, however, neither de-
fines nor establishes a test for determining a "traditional gov-
ernmental function." This lack of precision prompted Justice
Brennan to criticize the Court for creating a "conceptually un-
workable essential function test; and that the test is unworkable
is demonstrated by my Brethren's inability to articulate any
meaningful distinctions among state-operated railroads, . .
state-operated schools and hospitals, and state-operated police
and fire departments. '57 Despite this failure to "articulate any
meaningful distinctions," two guides as to what constitutes a
"traditional governmental function" may be found in the Court's
opinion. The first factor the Court focused on in National League
of Cities was the importance of the governmental activity.58 The
impact of the FLSA's wage and hour requirements on state and
local governments was illustrated first by reference to police and
fire services.59 The Court expressed its concern over the in-
creased costs of maintaining present levels of such services,60 and
was troubled particularly by reductions in quality and scope of
those services as a result of the imposition of the FLSA's wage
and hour provisions. 61 It cited as examples "of forced relin-
quishment of important governmental activites" the curtailment
of the California Highway Patrol training program 62 and of In-
glewood, California's affirmative action program for training
men and women for law enforcement careers.6 3 Further, if
courts construing the wage and hour provisions determine that
volunteer firemen are subject to them, communities unable to
bear the cost would be compelled to reduce their fire pro-
tection.6
4
54 Id. at 2475 n.18.
55 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
"6 E.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S.
553 (1957).
1 96 S. Ct. at 2487 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see note 20 supra.
5896 S. Ct. at 2471-72.
59
Id.
6 Id. at 2471.
6 1Id. at 2471-72.62 Id. at 2472.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 2473.
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Police and fire services, however, are not necessarily the
only important activities falling within the scope of the Court's
notion of "traditional governmental functions." The opinion
notes that "[t]he State of Arizona alleged that the annual addi-
tional expenditures which will be required if it is to continue to
provide essential state services may total $22- million dollars
[sic]," 65 but does not indicate to which essential services it was
referring. The references to police and fire services may indicate
that all public safety-related government services are sufficiently
important to be labeled "traditional governmental functions."
Similarly, the overruling of Wirtz66 suggests that school and
hospital services are "important" governmental activities, 7 and
the suggestion may extend to all health-and education-related
services. 68 National League of Cities, however, provides no clue as
to what further services are important enough to be considered
"traditional governmental functions."
The second factor relied on in National League of Cities in
formulating a concept of "traditional governmental functions" is
whether the service is one that "states have traditionally afforded
their citizens" 69-that is, whether the service is one that the gov-
ernment has historically provided. The opinion contains exam-
ples of such services-"fire prevention, police protection, sanita-
tion, public health, and parks and recreation" 70-and notes
that "[t]hese examples are obviously not an exhaustive catalogue
of the numerous line and support activities which are well within
the area of traditional operations of state and local govern-
ment. ' 71 This language suggests that the concept of "traditional
governmental functions" is a broad one, encompassing most
governmental activities.
The Court attempted to refine its concept of "traditional
governmental functions" by characterizing the examples it listed
as "activities [that] are typical of those performed by state and
local governments in discharging their dual functions of ad-
6 5 Id. at 2471 (emphasis supplied).
66 See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
67 See 96 S. Ct. at 2476. The Court may have been relying on the longtime gov-
ernmental provision of these services to bring them within the rubric of "traditional
governmental services." Id. For a discussion of tradition as a factor in the court's formu-
lation of the "traditional governmental function," see text accompanying notes 69-77
infra.
68 Indeed, the Court cites "public health" services as an example of a "traditional
governmental function." 96 S. Ct. at 2474.
691d.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 2474 n.16.
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ministering the public law and furnishing public services. In-
deed, it is functions such as these which governments are created
to provide ... "72 It observed that operation of a common
carrier railroad in interstate commerce does not meet the Na-
tional League of Cities criteria of a "traditional governmental
function"; 73 apparently operation of a railroad is neither ade-
quately grounded in history nor sufficiently important as a state
function.7 4 Private interstate common carrier rail service is gen-
erally available; the characterization of such service when pro-
vided by the state as a nontraditional governmental function thus
may suggest that whether the state is the sole or primary pro-
vider of the service is critical to a determination of whether
providing that service is a "traditional governmental function."
If the state is not the primary provider of the service, it is un-
likely that the service is one that a state ordinarily is "created to
provide"; in short, it is not likely to be "in an area that the States
have regarded as integral parts of their governmental activ-
ities.' 75 State and local governments, for example, provide office
space 76 and parking lots and garages77 for private use. The sub-
stantial provision of such services by the private sector of the
economy, however, might suggest to the Court that such ac-
tivities are not "traditional governmental functions." Whether
this would in fact be the case, however, is not clear from National
League of Cities itself.
Although a governmental activity may be both "important"
and "traditionally provided by the state,' 78 it is unclear whether
both factors are necessary conditions to qualifying a governmen-
tal activity as a "traditional governmental function." Nor is it
clear how these factors are to be applied in determining whether
an activity is such a function. On what basis, for example, is
providing parks a "traditional governmental function" while
providing interstate common carrier rail service is not?79 Other
72 Id. at 2474.
71See id. at 2475 n.18.
71 In one of the cases the Court declined to overrule, the state had owned and
operated the railroad since 1927. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 185 (1964).
75 96 S. Ct. at 2475 n.18.
76 See, e.g., N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws §§ 6601-6618 (McKinney Supp. 1975). See also
Courtesy Sandwich Shop, Inc. v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402,
240 N.Y.S.2d 1, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963).
71See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. AUTH. LAW §§ 1400-1600-t (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1975).
7' The Court referred to police and fire services as both important governmental
activities, 96 S. Ct. at 2471-72, and services traditionally provided by government, id. at
2474.
7' The Court indicated that provision of rail service is not an important govern-
mental function but failed to say why this is so. Id. at 2475 n.18.
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than the examples of traditional and nontraditional governmen-
tal functions referred to in the opinion itself,80 the Court gives
little guidance for determining whether a particular activity is a
"traditional governmental function. '81
IV. THE EQUAL PAY ACT AS AN EXERCISE OF THE
ENFORCEMENT CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The fourteenth amendment prohibits a state from denying
"to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."'82 The fifth section of the amendment empowers Congress
"to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. '8 3 This Com-
ment contends that the Equal Pay Act is appropriate legislation
to enforce the fourteenth amendment's equality guarantee and is
thus a valid exercise of congressional power under section five of
the amendment.84 National League of Cities does not foreclose
such an argument; the plurality opinion "express[es] no view as
to whether different results [than those reached in National
League of Cities] might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral
operations of state governments by exercising authority granted
it under other sections of the Constitution [than the commerce
clause] such as . . . § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 85
A. The Extent of Congressional Power Under Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment
Ex parte Virginia86 outlined the extent of Congress' power to
enforce the equal protection guarantee in this way:
Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to
carry out the objects the amendments have in view,
whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibi-
tions they contain, and to secure to all persons the en-
80 Id.; see text accompanying note 70 supra.
" For a discussion of the Court's failure to make itself clear on this point, see Note,
Municipal Bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment and the New Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1871, 1878-84 (1976).
82 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
83
Id. § 5.
84 The Department of Labor adopts this view when opposing motions to dismiss
filed by public employers in pending Equal Pay Act cases. Following National League of
Cities, such employers have argued that the Equal Pay Act is unconstitutional as applied
against them. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law Contra Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss And/Or Motion for Summary Judgment at 8, Usery v. Board of Ed., Civ. No.
K-76-672 (D. Md. 1976).
11 96 S. Ct. at 2474 n.1. The Court also disclaimed any opinion on the validity of
the provision's applicability to public employees on the basis of any other congressional
power. Id.
86 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
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joyment of perfect equality of civil rights and equal pro-
tection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not
prohibited, is brought within the domain of congres-
sional power.
8 7
Recent cases have reaffirmed Ex parte Virginia's test of the scope
of Congress' fourteenth amendment enforcement power. 88 For
example, in Katzenbach v. Morgan,89 citing the test enunciated in
Ex parte Virginia approvingly,9" the Court upheld a congressional
ban on state literacy tests as a requirement of achieving the right
to vote. The Court in Morgan further noted that congressional
power to restrict state action under the enforcement clause ex-
tends even beyond the power of the Court to invalidate state
action on the basis of the equal protection clause itself.91
The equal protection clause prohibits sex discrimination that
does not survive the increasingly strict scrutiny the Court applies
to such discrimination.92 Equal pay legislation applied to the
states is, therefore, appropriate legislation "to carry out the ob-
jects" of the fourteenth amendment and "tends to enforce sub-
mission to the prohibitions [it] contain[s]." 93
8 Id. at 345-46.
8 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 96 S. Ct. 2666, 2670-71 (1976); Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966).
89 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
90 Id. at 650.
9 Id. at 649. The Court said, "[T]he question before us here [is]: Without regard to
whether the judiciary would find that the Equal Protection Clause itself nullifies New
York's English literacy requirement as so applied, could Congress prohibit the enforce-
ment of the state law by legislating under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment?" Id. The
Court answered this question in the affirmative. Id. at 651-59. That the courts will not
always go as far under the equal protection clause as Congress is permitted to go under
the enforcement clause is illustrated, when compared with the foregoing, by Lassiter v.
Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959), which upheld North Carolina's literacy
test as not in all circumstances violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
It might be argued that the prohibition against wage discrimination based on
sex, contained in the Equal Pay Act, is constitutionally mandated by the fourteenth
amendment's equal protection clause. See cases cited note 46 supra. Such a constitutional
argument obviates an aggrieved employee's need for a statutory claim such as one
founded upon the Equal Pay Act. Even if wage discrimination based on sex vio-
lates the equal protection clause, however, the Equal Pay Act adds substance to the
prohibition. Under the Act, courts have developed the doctrine of substantial equality,
by which, for the purposes of the Act, jobs need only be substantially equal and not
identical to require equal pay. Hodgson v. Brookhaven General Hosp., 436 F.2d 719
(5th Cir. 1970); Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 905 (1970). This standard would not necessarily prevail under the equal protection
clause alone. Moreover, the Equal Pay Act's remedy of requiring employers to raise the
lower wage to the level of the higher, see text accompanying note 47 supra, is not neces-
sarily mandated by the equal protection clause.
92 See note 46 supra & accompanying text.
93 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879).
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Moreover, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,94 decided four days after
National League of Cities, a unanimous Court held that a state that
violated the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 9 -prohibiting, inter alia, sex discrimination by em-
ployers-was liable to its affected employees for backpay and
attorneys' fees; the Court made no distinction between em-
ployees engaged in "traditional governmental functions" and
those not so engaged. Congress extended coverage of Title VII
to the states on the basis of section five of the fourteenth
amendment.96 By upholding the award of backpay and attor-
neys' fees, the Court implicitly found that basis sufficient to sup-
port the application of Title VII to the states.97 The Equal Pay
Act complements the prohibitions against sex discrimination in
employment contained in Title VII by forbidding discrimination
in wage payments. 98 If the enactment of Title VII is within the
power of Congress under the fourteenth amendment's enforce-
ment clause, then the enactment of the Equal Pay Act is similarly
within Congress' power.
Legislation enacted pursuant to section five of the four-
teenth amendment does not infringe impermissibly upon state
sovereignty. The Court in Ex parte Virginia pointed out that
"[t]he prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed
to the States, and they are to a degree restrictions of State power.
It is these which Congress is empowered to enforce .... Such
enforcement is no invasion of State sovereignty." 99 The Court
reaffirmed this principle in Bitzer, saying that the expansion of
congressional power under the enforcement clauses of the thir-
teenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments resulted in a "cor-
responding diminution of state sovereignty.""' The Court
added,
94 96 S. Ct. 2666 (1976).
95 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). Title VII prohibits an employer
from, inter alia, failing to hire an individual because of the individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin and similarly prohibits an employer from discharging
an individual for any of these same reasons. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970). Indeed,
Title VII also prohibits such discrimination "with respect to [an individual's] compensa-
tion, terms, conditions or privileges of employment .... Id. The Equal Pay Act gives
greater content and precision to, as well as an independent basis for, the prohibition of
wage discrimination. See text accompanying notes 22 supra & 98 infra.
'b See, e.g., 96 S. Ct. at 2670 n.9; H.R. RP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19
(1971); S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1971).
9 7 See 96 S. Ct. at 2671 & n.l1.
98 Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied., 398
U.S. 905 (1970).
99 100 U.S. at 346.
100 96 S. Ct. at 2671.
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When Congress acts pursuant to § 5 [of the fourteenth
amendment] not only is it exercising legislative author-
ity plenary within the terms of the grant, it is exercising
that authority under one section of a constitutional
amendment whose other sections by their own terms
embody limitations on state authority.""
The Equal Pay Act, therefore, as legislation that enforces the
fourteenth amendment's prohibition against discrimination, is a
valid exercise of congressional power.
1 0
2
B. Upholding the Constitutionality of Congressional
Legislation on Other Than Its Stated Constitutional Basis
Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act as an exercise of its
commerce power. 1° 3 This Comment has concluded, however,
that although the Act as applied to public employees engaged in
"traditional governmental functions" is an unconstitutional exer-
cise of such power,10 4 it may be applied constitutionally to all
public employees as an exercise of congressional power to en-
force the fourteenth amendment t °5 This conclusion is not
jeopardized by Congress' failure to articulate a constitutionally
adequate basis for the legislation.
Griffin v. Breckinridge116 presented the Court with a statute
based on the fourteenth amendment's enforcement clause, pro-
viding a civil cause of action for private conspiracies. 1 07 The
Court declined to consider whether the statute was constitutional
,",Id. Indeed, the Court again cited approvingly Exparte Virginia, id. at 2670-71, as
it had in Morgan. See text accompanying note 90 supra.
It is worth noting that the aspect of state sovereignty at issue in Bitzer was the
states' immunity from suit under the I 1th amendment. Therefore, the aspects of
sovereignty discussed in this Comment-which may be said generally to be the unarticu-
lated areas of state prerogative reserved to the states by the 10th amendment, see text
accompanying note 15, and, more particularly, the power of the states to conduct in-
tegral "traditional governmental functions" without federal interference-are not iden-
tical to those addressed by the Bitzer Court. The 5th section of the 14th amendment,
however, does not on its face circumscribe Congress' enforcement power to impositions
on only some areas of state sovereignty. Although the narrow holding of Bitzer may be
limited to the 14th amendment's effect on 11th amendment sovereign immunity from
suit, there is no reason to limit the case's implications in this way.
102 The Third Circuit recently has reached the same conclusion. See Usery v. Al-
legheny Co. Inst. Dist., Civ. No. 74-1153, slip op. at 13 (3d Cir. Oct. 28, 1976).
103 See text accompanying note 32 supra.
104 See text accompanying notes 31-50 supra.
10 5 See text accompanying notes 82-101 supra.
106 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
107 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1970) (a citizen deprived of his civil rights or injured in his
person or property by two or more persons conspiring or going in disguise on a high-
way or premises of another has a civil cause of action against any conspirator).
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under the provision explicitly relied on,118 and instead upheld
the constitutionality of the statute on two other grounds: (1) as
a permissible exercise of congressional power under the thir-
teenth amendment's enforcement clause, 109 and (2) as a protec-
tion of the constitutionally protected right of interstate travel." 0
The Griffin decision is a logical extension of established
principles of statutory construction. The courts presume that
Congress acts within its constitutional powers,"' and construe
congressional actions so as to hold them constitutional whenever
possible.' 1 2 It follows from these basic principles that a court
should uphold the constitutionality of legislation on any legiti-
mate constitutional ground, whether or not that ground was the
stated basis of the legislation. a 3
Consistently with this analysis, two courts have recently
stated that Congress' failure to pass the Equal Pay Act as an ex-
ercise of its power to enforce the fourteenth amendment does
108 403 U.S. at 107.
109
Id. at 104-05.
1 'Od. at 105-06.
1' United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 449 (1953) (plurality
opinion).1 '12 E.g., Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571 (1973); United
States v. Vultch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 310 U.S.
1, 30 (1937) ("The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to
destroy.").
113 The Civil Rights Cases do not require a contrary result. There, the Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of legislation enacted to enforce the fourteenth amend-
ment. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court declared that the legislation was an unconstitu-
tional exercise of the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment because the
legislation prohibited certain private action whereas the fourteenth amendment only
prohibits state action. Id. at 11-19. The Court added that, "whether Congress, in the
exercise of its power to regulate commerce amongst the several States, might or might
not pass a law regulating rights in public conveyances passing from one State to an-
other, is . .. a question which is not now before us, as the sections in question are not
conceived in any such view." Id. at 19. Thus, the Court seemed to suggest that it would
not seek a constitutional basis for the legislation, such as the commerce clause, beyond
that expressly stated by Congress. The government, however, had not argued the
commerce clause as a basis for the legislation. Id. at 5-7. As the Court would later point
out in a discussion of the Civil Rights Cases: "Since the commerce power was not re-
lied on by the Government and was without support in the record it is understand-
able that the Court ... excluded the Commerce Clause as a possible source of power."
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252 (1964). Indeed, the
Court in the Civil Rights Cases itself noted: "[N]o countenance of authority for the pas-
sage of the law in question can be found in either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth
Amendment . . . and no other ground of authority for its passage being suggested, it must
necessarily be declared void .... " 109 U.S. at 25 (emphasis supplied). The failure of
the Court to consider the commerce clause in the Civil Rights Cases, therefore, is sup-
port only for the proposition that the Court will not consider constitutional authority
for legislation if that authority is not argued before it.
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not preclude a court from upholding the legislation on the basis
of such power.'
14
V. CONCLUSION
The Equal Pay Act is an unconstitutional exercise of Con-
gress' commerce power when applied to public employees in
traditional governmental functions following National League of
Cities. The Act, like the FLSA's wage and hour provisions, is a
valid exercise of Congress' commerce power when applied to
public employees in nontraditional governmental functions. The
Court in National League of Cities listed several governmental ac-
tivities it deemed traditional governmental functions and one it
deemed a nontraditional governmental function. It failed, how-
ever, to provide any guidelines from which one can determine,
with certainty, that a governmental activity is a nontraditional
governmental function. Nonetheless, the Equal Pay Act, as ap-
plied to all public employees, is a constitutional exercise of Con-
gress' power under section five of the fourteenth amendment to
enforce that amendment's substantive provisions. Courts may
uphold legislation, such as the Equal Pay Act, on a constitutional
basis other than that upon which Congress explicitly rested it.
The Equal Pay Act, therefore, may stand-National League of
Cities notwithstanding.
114 Usery v. Allegheny Co. Inst. Dist., Civ. No. 74-1153, slip op. at 13-15 (3d Cir.
Oct. 28, 1976) (although Congress did not explicitly rely upon its power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment in enacting the Equal Pay Act, the Court's concern is "with the
actual powers of the national government"); Usery v. Dallas Independent School Dist.,
421 F. Supp. 111, 114 & n.3 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (dictum).
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